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grand scale in Asia." At other times, his perspective could be 
frightfully naive. He described Sukarno of Indonesia as "a great 
democratic leader," and Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam as one 
who represented "the parliamentary tradition where free speech 
and free press are permitted, where opposing views are tolerated 
and even encouraged, where differences of opinion shape the course 
of events, where there is no dictator, where men debate and air their 
differences and then settle on a compromise solution." 
Although he never left his ROTC unit in Walla Walla during 
World War I, Douglas qualified for burial in Arlington National 
Cemetery and was interred there in 1980 near Warren, Black, and 
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Although it is doubtful that Douglas knew 
Woody Guthrie "from my hobo days," as he later claimed, he in-
sisted that "This Land is Your Land, This Land is My Land" be 
sung at his funeral. "It reflects not a socialist dream," he noted, 
"but . . . the right to move from place to place to look for a job or 
establish a new home, the right to move interstate without payment 
of a fee. . . . In other words, it expresses the vagrancy issue as I 
have expressed it and as it has become ingrained in the law." To 
the very end, he remained the Huck Finn of our judicial tradition, 
sharply critical of American society, but ultimately uncommitted, 
irresponsible, and self-indulgent, always anxious to escape Aunt 
Polly's grasp by fleeing into the wilderness. 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT. By Lucas A. Powe, Jr.• Berkeley, Ca.: 
University of California Press. 1987. Pp. x, 295. $25.00. 
CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
By Patrick Parsons.2 Lexington, Ma.: Lexington Books. 
1987. Pp. iv, 168. $24.00. 
Henry GellerJ 
As their titles indicate, these two books are both about broad-
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casting and the first amendment. They contain, in my opinion, able 
arguments for bad solutions to the problems of that difficult subject. 
I 
It is axiomatic that licensing of the press is an unconstitutional 
prior restraint which offends our deeply held notions of how a free 
press should function. We cannot tolerate such censorship because, 
as the Supreme Court told us over fifty years ago, our complex 
modem society has a "primary need of a vigilant and courageous 
press."4 Professor Lucas Powe, in American Broadcasting and the 
First Amendment, argues that the licensing of broadcasting is like-
wise improper, because it inevitably leads to censorship, as well as 
bureaucratic inconsistency and political partisanship. By chroni-
cling the history of abuses at the FCC under the current "public 
trustee" system of licensing, Professor Powe seeks to persuade us 
that with any system of licensing, the licensor will "condemn to 
silence that which it fears, hates, or cannot understand." 
Powe begins by disputing the traditional thesis that broadcast 
regulation can be justified by reference to the differences between 
broadcasting and the print media. Historically, broadcasting has 
never been accorded the full range of first amendment privileges 
that the print media enjoys. Thus, at the same time that the 
Supreme Court held that even the threat of newspaper censorship 
was impermissible,s the federal courts were upholding the FCC's 
authority to scrutinize program content in order to make public in-
terest determinations.6 Yet broadcasting is clearly a part of the 
press, writes Powe, and we should therefore heed the lesson of cen-
turies of English experience: that the inevitable by-product of li-
censing is abuse. 
Powe traces the judicial distinction between print and broad-
casting back to early decisions which found that motion pictures 
and other forms of "entertainment" were not entitled to first 
amendment protection. According to Powe, the whole public trus-
teeship concept, including the notion of spectrum scarcity, was re-
ally a makeshift justification which was designed to obfuscate the 
original erroneous assumption that broadcasting is not fully pro-
tected by the first amendment because it is so different from print. 
Seminal cases such as NBC v. U.S. and Red Lion Broadcasting v. 
FCC mistakenly failed to recognize that the first amendment is vio-
lated by requiring any license to use the radio spectrum-that any 
4. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931). 
5. Id. at 722-23. 
6. Trinity Methodist Church v. FCC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932). 
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justification for licensing necessarily misses the mark. Rather than 
embodying a critical look at broadcast regulation, Red Lion is best 
seen as the all-too-human response of Justices raised in an era when 
radio was a novelty, who felt compelled to construct new legal theo-
ries to deal with it. 
The book then describes a parade of horribles under FCC regu-
lation of broadcasting. Franklin Roosevelt attempted to retaliate 
against his newspaper critics by preventing them from owning radio 
licenses as well. Nixon assaulted the networks and sought to under-
mine public broadcasting. While these attempts were not as suc-
cessful as the politicians had hoped, Powe notes that the Eisen-
hower administration made partisan political appointments to the 
Commission. Those partisan commissioners "stood as temporary 
custodians to a huge pot of gold, and it was their decision who 
would get their hands into it." Powe believes that the standards the 
FCC used to determine whether grants of broadcast licenses would 
be in the public interest were applied unevenly at best, and at worst 
were based solely on politics and were therefore "scandalous." 
Such partisanship is a natural result of the fact that the majority of 
commissioners are from the incumbent political party, since "licens-
ing will always be used to further impermissible agendas." 
Powe argues that the FCC, by virtue of the fact that it wields 
the ultimate threat-nonrenewal of the license--has seriously chil-
led broadcasters. He points out that, in major cases, broadcasters 
were punished for failing to serve the "public interest" and thus the 
threat is credible, especially in light of the almost constant approval 
of FCC decisions by the D.C. Circuit. 
It is this supervision of broadcast licensees by the FCC which 
Powe views as one of the basic evils of the public trustee licensing 
scheme. The fairness doctrine, instead of being designed to ensure 
diversity and balance, is a mechanism by which the FCC can muz-
zle broadcasters with unpopular opinions. For Powe, Red Lion ex-
emplifies such a use. The Democratic party used the doctrine to 
gain over 1700 hours of free air time and to inhibit right-wing 
broadcasters. All this was due to an attack by the Reverend Billy 
James Hargis that was simply a rebuttal to an article by Fred Cook 
in The Nation. Thus, the fairness doctrine is fundamentally unfair. 
Worse, it chills speech simply by looming as a threat. Quoting 
President Nixon's head of the Office of Telecommunications Policy, 
T. Clay Whitehead, Powe agrees that "[t]he value of the sword of 
Damocles is that it hangs, not falls." 
In a chapter on "Maintaining Cultural Morality," Powe re-
views the history of the FCC's treatment of offensive language in-
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eluding sexual references, drug lyrics, and four letter words. He 
notes that the FCC initially used the circuitous "inadequate super-
vision" rationale (licensee failed to supervise station operation) to 
suppress offensive content rather than directly and candidly censor-
ing indecent language. The result, however, was the same: the 
FCC punished stations for airing unconventional programming 
which was offensive to white, middle- class values. Later, of course, 
the FCC did embrace the indecency theory, adding nuances of its 
own in FCC v. Pacifica. As it stands, the Commission has legal 
authority to prohibit the use of offensive language in order to pro-
tect children. In addition, there is the notion that such regulation is 
justified because broadcast stations are pervasive intruders into the 
home. Professor Powe insists that such government action is inap-
propriate and unlawful in a diverse and free society. 
Powe contends that public ownership is not a sufficient reason 
for licensing and that the scarcity theory is both ill-fitting and elu-
sive. For example, responding to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in 
NBC stating that licensing is necessary to prevent confusion and 
chaos in the airwaves, Powe asserts: 
It is true that if everyone broadcasts, no one can be heard. But it is also true that if 
everyone at a park speaks at the same time, no one can hear and, equally, that if you 
write your message on a piece of paper and I write mine over it, no one can read 
your message. 
His point is that technological scarcity does not truly exist; what we 
lack is a system of property rights. And to create such rights, we do 
not require an FCC. 
Powe also rejects every other form of the scarcity argument. 
Conceding that the spectrum is inherently limited, he notes that so 
are all resources. In any event, technological advances will address 
this problem. True, the number who want to broadcast exceeds the 
number of frequencies, but this is because the licenses are free. 
Likewise, although not everyone who wishes to broadcast is able to 
do so, as a practical economic matter this is also true of newspapers. 
Finally, responding to the notion that broadcast stations are scarce 
relative to printed media, Powe argues that not only is the number 
of broadcast outlets increasing while the number of daily newspa-
pers is declining, but a proper comparison would include CB radios 
and the like as "broadcast outlets." What is behind these pro-regu-
lation theories, urges Powe, is a basic and irrational fear of the 
broadcast medium; the evidence is Pacifica. 
To those who are conversant with the literature, Professor 
Powe's points will sound familiar. The great strength of Powe's 
514 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 5:510 
book is its cogent marshalling of the evidence to support his thesis. 
Clearly and directly written, it is a pleasure to read. 
Nevertheless I believe that the work is too one-sided. Powe is 
right that the FCC has committed several first amendment blun-
ders. But it has also stressed that it cannot censor the most distaste-
ful material (e.g., anti-Semitic matter);' that it encourages robust, 
wide-open presentations;s that there should be great discretion 
vested in the broadcast licensee and thus very high barriers before 
any fairness complaint will even be referred to a broadcaster;9 that 
it will not investigate charges of news misrepresentations in the ab-
sence of substantial extrinsic evidence or documents that on their 
face reflect deliberate distortion; 10 and so on. The Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, which Powe regards as a 
"patsy" for the FCC, has stressed that the Commission is not to 
intervene in broadcast journalism except in the most flagrant 
cases. II 
I don't recognize the FCC portrayed by Powe: active, eager to 
insure that licensees conform to its view of the public interest, ready 
to pounce on the errant broadcaster. The FCC that I have known 
intimately since the 1940s is inept, reluctant to act in the public 
interest, and a captive of the industry it regulates. Powe lists the 
WLBT-TV case as supporting his position. But the FCC twice re-
newed this racist broadcaster who would only present the segrega-
tionist point of view, white churches but no black ones, white 
colleges but never a black one, and so on; it was the Court which 
ruled that such a broadcaster simply could not be renewed as a pub-
lic trustee.12 Powe cites the FCC's WHDH decisioniJ as another 
chilling action. But WHDH was not a regular renewal; the FCC 
regarded the case as a new comparative hearing because of the im-
proper ex parte presentations that had been made by WHDH. 
Powe should have acknowledged that the FCC's record in the com-
parative renewal field is shamefully passive: the incumbent always 
7. Anti-Defamation League v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 
u.s. 930 (1969). 
8. E.g., Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964). 
9. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 17-21 (1974). 
10. /d. at 21. 
11. Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976); NBC v. FCC 
(Pensions), 516 F.2d 1101, 1155, 1156, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 
(1976). See also CBS v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
12. Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143 (1965), rev'd and remanded, Office of 
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); 425 
F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
13. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), aff'd, Greater Boston Television Corp. v. 
F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cen. denied, 402 U.S. 1007 (1971). 
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wins, no matter how poor its performance has been.t4 The Com-
mission has never met a comparative renewal applicant that it did 
not eventually favor. 
The picture is no better in regular renewals: broken promises 
don't matter;ts licenses can be granted with 0/0 in news/public af-
fairs; t6 a licensee on short-term renewal can commit the same kind 
of fraud on advertisers and still gain another renewal.t7 This is a 
sorry record. Powe soundly notes the seminal work of the econo-
mist Ronald Coase; he should have heeded Coase's estimate of the 
FCC regulatory process: a fake wrestling match, full of grunts and 
groans, signifying nothing. 
Even in his treatment of theory, Powe is too one-sided. As he 
notes, government licensing stemmed from the engineering chaos of 
the 1920s. Since more people wanted to broadcast than there were 
available frequencies, the government had to choose one and keep 
all others from interfering with that authorization. Powe is correct 
that the government could have simply auctioned the frequency (for 
an indefinite or a suitably long term). But he does not recognize 
that there were strong reasons for rejecting this alternative and 
adopting a licensing scheme. 
The government wanted communities to have their own local 
broadcast outlets, so it allocated valuable frequencies on this basis. 
Further, it wanted broadcasting to contribute to an informed electo-
rate, so important to the proper functioning of a republic; thus 
again it bestowed an inordinate amount of the scarce radio spec-
trum to broadcasting compared to the many other claimants. If it is 
reasonable to allocate the spectrum on these bases, it follows that 
the licensing scheme should operate so as to advance those same 
goals: licenses go to those who volunteer to serve the public interest 
by being effective local outlets presenting a reasonable amount of 
informational programming geared to their communities. The 
scheme was one of government licensing of essentially private 
broadcasting with wide discretion but reasonably tempered to serve 
the needs of the community and the nation. 
Powe is right that any such scheme is bound to create first 
amendment strains. But the FCC could have adopted objective 
standards directed to the bedrock allocations scheme (e.g., 15% lo-
14. See, e.g., Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Mo-
line Television Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 263 (1971). 
15. See KORD, Inc., 31 F.C.C. 85 (1961) and Moline Television Corp .• supra note 14. 
16. See, e.g., Herman Hall, II F.C.C.2d 344 (1968); Cox & Johnson, Broadcasting in 
America and the FCC's License Renewal Policy: An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d I 
(1968). 
17. Star Stations of Indiana, Inc., 19 F.C.C.2d 991 (1969). 
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cal and 20% informational programming, the latter defined broadly 
and also including the local category, in the hours 6:00a.m. to mid-
night). This would have left the choice of programming to meet the 
guidelines to the discretion of the broadcaster, with the FCC having 
to intervene only in the most egregious cases such as WLBT- TV. 
The FCC could have applied the fairness doctrine only at renewal, 
and with a New York Times v. Sullivan standard of bad faith or 
reckless disregard; this would have allowed the Commission to fo-
cus on the essential goal-the public fiduciary concept-rather than 
trying to insure fairness on every issue, a deep intrusion into daily 
broadcast journalism. 
In fact, however, the FCC is wholly ineffective. It does not 
receive any programming information; it gets only a postcard at re-
newal and depends solely on the public to bring to its attention pro-
gramming complaints. This is a joke: the public is busy with its 
own problems; it is not interested in checking up on the perfor-
mance of the many broadcast stations. Starting with the Ferris 
Commission in 1980 and continuing today, the FCC, with the ap-
proval of the Court of Appeals, has simply given up. 
Powe wants reform because of first amendment concerns. I be-
lieve that the FCC's ineffectual record, for over fifty years, is a 
stronger reason for drastic change. We should adopt a system of 
auctions (giving licensees who have recently engaged in a "private 
auction" some sufficient grace period) or at least reasonable spec-
trum usage fees (e.g., a percentage of gross revenues). The proceeds 
could be used to fund public broadcasting. This would give us a 
structure that works for the achievement of public interest goals. 
And we would have removed the sources of the first amendment 
problems in commercial broadcasting. 
I and others have long advocated such an approach, and there 
was significant congressional interest in such reforms during the 
early 1980s. But the broadcasters, and the National Association of 
Broadcasters in particular, strongly oppose it. They like being 
called "public trustees." No one then calls for auctions or annual 
spectrum usage fees; what's more, they can seek carriage on cable 
systems as local public trustees. They gain all this with no really 
enforceable public fiduciary obligations. 
Broadcasters have sufficient clout to prevent passage of any 
such deregulatory/auction/spectrum usage scheme. Ironically, the 
sole hope for progress lies in the present attack by broadcasters on 
the fairness doctrine. The FCC has cooperated by eliminating the 
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doctrine, and the matter is now before the Court.1s There is, how-
ever, no such thing as a surgical strike on the fairness doctrine. If-
and it is a big "if"-the broadcasters win on their arguments that 
there is no scarcity or that broadcast regulation has chilling effects, 
the public trustee concept will fall. Then the question will arise: 
why is the broadcaster being kept on the frequency {and all others 
enjoined by the government) if he is not required to operate as a 
public fiduciary? Why not an auction or usage fee? 
More likely, however, we will drift with the present ineffectual 
system for the rest of the century. Eventually, technology will res-
cue us. The fiber optic into the home, with its enormous capacity, 
or digital radio will bring us such abundance that there will be no 
need for any content-based approach. We will have video publish-
ing over common carrier facilities, and the print model will govern. 
Whether Powe or I will live to see that first amendment nirvana is a 
different question. 
II 
Professor Patrick Parsons's Cable Television deals with an im-
portant and topical issue: the status of cable television under the 
first amendment. It takes its place beside another excellent work, 
CableSpeech, by George Shapiro, Philip Kurland, and James 
Mercurio. 
After almost four decades of operation, cable television's status 
under the first amendment remains unsettled. The Supreme Court 
ducked the issue in the Preferred Communications case,19 stating 
that it needed a more thoroughly developed record. Preferred and 
several other cases are now making their way through the lower 
courts, and the Court will have its opportunity on a full record 
sometime before the end of the decade. 
Cable television is playing an ever larger role in the electronic 
mass media. Today slightly over half of our television households 
receive television through cable, and the proportion is rising. The 
satellite has made feasible cheap, efficient distribution to the na-
tion's over 7000 cable systems, spawning scores of cable program-
ming services in addition to the traditional carriage of broadcast 
signals and fostering cable penetration of the larger markets. This 
18. Syracuse Peace Council, 99 F.C.C.2d 1389 (1984), recon. denied, 59 R.R.2d 179 
(1985), remanded sub nom., Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated 
sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. WTVH, 2 F.C.C. Red. 5043 (1987), recon. denied, 
F.C.C. 88-130 (April 17, 1988), appeal pending, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, Case No. 
87-1566 (D.C. Cir.) 
19. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
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$12 billion industry, with its winning mixture of pay, advertiser-
based, and hybrid programming, has a bright future. 
The choice of a regulatory scheme for cable thus has great sig-
nificance for the nation. And the proper scheme can only be deline-
ated on the basis of a sound analysis of cable's first amendment 
status. 
Professor Parsons succinctly sets out the pertinent back-
ground, tracing the regulatory and judicial developments affecting 
cable's first amendment position. This discussion will be helpful, 
particularly to students seeking a lucid summary of this complex 
history. 
Parsons also provides background on first amendment theory. 
He favors an "equitable protection" model-one that "strives for 
the greatest amount of protection and the least amount of interfer-
ence with the rights of the individual and the rights of the collec-
tive." He finds that none of the various models of first amendment 
rights-broadcast, print, public forum, and public utility-meets 
the requirements of the equitable protection model when applied to 
cable. The broadcast model, with its close governmental supervi-
sion of overall programming efforts, fairness, and equal time re-
quirements, does not strike a proper balance between the rights of 
the collective and the individual, since it "fails to provide sufficient 
protection to the individual from potential state interference in free 
speech rights." The print model, on the other hand, tilts against the 
collective, because cable appears to be a natural economic monop-
oly, with one entity thus controlling the flow of ideas over the scores 
of cable TV channels. 
Parsons also finds fault with the application of the public fo-
rum and public utility models. The public forum model, in provid-
ing access as a constitutional right, could strike the proper balance, 
but judicial precedent is lacking to support its extension to cable. 
The same practical defect applies to the common carrier (public 
utility) model, which also "tends to overbalance in favor of the col-
lective," leaving too much room for government control. Professor 
Parsons's solution is to carve out a new constitutional right over 
cable for specific messages or programs. He would do so first by 
limiting Miami Herald v. Tornillo to the print medium on the 
ground that, though a newspaper may be an economic monopoly, 
those who dislike its views can express themselves elsewhere in the 
same medium (for example, pamphlets and handouts). Cable, on 
the other hand, is a natural economic monopoly and therefore the 
courts should fashion a constitutional right of access to cable while 
protecting the operator from most other governmental regulation. 
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As with the entire book, the argument is clearly and cogently 
advanced. Its purpose is admirable, but in my opinion it is dead 
wrong. First, I realize that first amendment abuses can come with 
cable franchising and related regulations. From a first amendment 
viewpoint, life is much simpler if the judiciary preempts the area on 
constitutional grounds and narrows its own focus to one aspect, ac-
cess. But throughout the book, Parsons has emphasized the practi-
cal-what is feasible under the law. And the practical here surely 
encompasses the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.2° It 
controls this area unless it is unconstitutional. 
The 1984 Cable Act authorizes the franchising entity to require 
access channels (the so called PEG channels-public, educational, 
and governmental access), over which the cable operator is not to 
exercise content control. The operator must fulfill franchise provi-
sions for services, facilities or equipment supporting these PEG 
channels. And the Act requires cable systems with 36-54 channel 
capacity to set aside 10% of the channels for leased commercial 
access (i.e., on a common carrier basis), and those with 55 or more, 
15% of channel capacity. 
In my view, these provisions are constitutional. Parsons be-
lieves that there can be no valid basis for the franchise process. But 
common sense dictates that no person can dig up the streets or erect 
poles along the streets without a permit (franchise). The number of 
persons who can be allowed to do so for cable television operation is 
limited by technical considerations, but there is no need to explore 
that issue. I agree with Parsons that in actual operation cable turns 
out to be a natural monopoly. The government is thus bestowing a 
mass media permit that ends in monopoly operation, with one en-
tity controlling the content of 75 or more TV channels into the 
home. In these circumstances, the government clearly has a legiti-
mate interest in promoting the diversification principle underlying 
the first amendment.2t That is the purpose of the access provisions 
of the Act.22 
This statutory scheme meets the test of United States v. 
O'Brien. There is a substantial, indeed a compelling, justification 
for governmental intervention, and that intervention is narrowly 
tailored to accomplish the goal. The leased access requirement is 
limited to the larger system, and leaves 85-90% of the channel ca-
pacity to the full discretion of the cable operator. Further, the cable 
operator can use the access channels for its own purposes if there is 
20. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-59 (Supp. III 1985). 
21. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945). 
22. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 30-36 (1984). 
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too little demand for access use. Significantly, access rules are not 
content-related regulation such as exists in the broadcast field: 
there is no review here of overall public service programming; in-
deed, the Act proscribes such content regulation. Thus, while the 
print model (Tornillo) is not followed, neither is the broadcast 
model (Red Lion). Rather, a different model has been carved out to 
meet cable's unique characteristics, as the concurring opinion in 
Preferred indicated might be a proper course. 
Professor Parsons has particular difficulty in arguing that this 
legislative approach is unconstitutional, in light of his belief that 
there is a constitutional right to access in cable. Assuming that is 
so, the legislature can clearly act to implement that right, as it has 
done in similar areas (e.g., voting rights legislation to carry out the 
fourteenth amendment). 
In this field, legislative solutions are more effective and appro-
priate. If the matter is left to the judiciary, it can act only when it 
finds a constitutional infirmity and its remedy is limited to the spe-
cific case. Congress on the other hand, can devise broader policies, 
and can revise through the regulatory agency. It can provide criti-
cally important financial support for the PEG channels through use 
of the 5% franchise fee permitted under the Act.23 Without such 
support, the mere provision of the channel capacity can be 
ineffectual. 
In short, I believe that it is preferable to allow the legislature to 
act and to have the courts review such action for constitutionality, 
rather than for the courts to proscribe all legislative action and 
themselves create a narrow consitutional right of access-a most 
dubious process. With such review, the courts can invalidate im-
proper legislative restraints on the cable operator's first amendment 
rights. This traditional approach certainly has its problems and 
messes. But it is the most democratic and flexible one, and it as-
signs to Congress its proper role as an architect of policy and to the 
judiciary its role as a check on unconstitutional action. 
Professor Parsons is thus right in his focus on the critical prob-
lem-cable as a monopolist controlling many TV channels into the 
home-and right in his solution-access. But I think his recom-
mended method for creating access rights is seriously flawed. 
23. I do not mean to extoll the 1984 Act as a paragon of sound policy. It is seriously 
flawed with respect to the use of the 5% franchise fee. See generally Geller, Ciamporcero & 
Lampert, The Cable Franchise Fee and the First Amendment, 39 FED. CoMMUNICATIONS 
L.J. 1 (1987). 
